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Abstract— The safety of Automated Vehicles (AV) as Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) depends on the safety of their consisting
modules (software and hardware) and their rigorous integra-
tion. Deep Learning is one of the dominant techniques used for
perception, prediction and decision making in AVs. The accu-
racy of predictions and decision-making is highly dependant on
the tests used for training their underlying deep-learning. In
this work, we propose a method for screening and classifying
simulation-based driving test data to be used for training and
testing controllers. Our method is based on monitoring and
falsification techniques, which lead to a systematic automated
procedure for generating and selecting qualified test data. We
used Responsibility Sensitive Safety (RSS) rules as our qualifier
specifications to filter out the random tests that do not satisfy
the RSS assumptions. Therefore, the remaining tests cover
driving scenarios that the controlled vehicle does not respond
safely to its environment. Our framework is distributed with
the publicly available S-TALIRO and Sim-ATAV tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of safe, fully autonomous systems has
become one of the seminal technological problems of our
time. Their eventual development will have a significant
impact on mobility, with solutions ranging from personal
mobility, to mobility-on-demand systems. The potential of
automation carries a plethora of environmental and financial
benefits [1].
Major components of these systems are developed to
tackle problems of perception, decision making, and control,
often using machine learning techniques such as Deep Neural
Networks [2]. Ensuring that these components are bug-free is
a challenging problem. To make the problem more difficult,
emergent behavior that arises as a result of the complex
interaction between these components is extremely difficult
to detect [3], [4].
Physical testing has shown to be expensive, time con-
suming, and generally inefficient. In addition, there is no
consensus on what constitutes an adequate metric in this
area. It is questionable whether metrics such as miles driven
and miles per disengagement, which are typically reported
to governmental agencies [5], are sufficient since most of the
testing and miles driven are conducted in carefully chosen
locations and scenarios. As a result, these metrics fail to
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capture a wide array of conditions and scenarios that are
typical in day-to-day passenger driving.
Recent research [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] supports
simulation-based and virtual methods as a scalable alter-
native. Simulation enables inexpensive, quick testing for
arbitrarily complex conditions and scenarios. It also speeds
up development by enabling automakers to quickly iterate
and support the rapid development of their systems. In
addition, since simulation-based methods have been studied
extensively in the testing and verification community (see
[12] for an overview), it is only natural to attempt an
extension to the autonomous vehicle domain.
In [13], the authors develop a probabilistic programming
language SCENIC to define scenes, which are configurations
of physical objects in traffic environments. The probabilistic
component enables the assignment of behavior distributions
to specific objects in the scene. In [14], [15], the authors
present Sim-ATAV, part of the S-TALIRO [16] toolbox, for
adversarial testing of autonomous vehicles with machine
learning components. The tool enables the generation of
test cases that falsify formal requirements expressed in
Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [17]. Frameworks like [8]
and [18] and the corresponding toolchains provide similar
functionality to Sim-ATAV for search-based test generation.
A challenge encountered by all these methods is how to
properly define what constitutes a violation of safe driving
behaviors.
In this paper, Responsibility Sensitive Safety (RSS) [19],
[20], [21] rules are utilized for classifying and qualifying
driving test data to determine ego-centric and meaningful
driving scenarios. In order to achieve that, RSS specifica-
tions are formalized into STL to enable formal, algorith-
mic reasoning over them. In [22], RSS specifications were
utilized to monitor naturalistic traffic data obtained from
the CommonRoad library [23]. In this paper, the driving
scenarios are generated through simulation. Given formal
RSS specifications, a requirements-guided search through a
stochastic optimization algorithm finds worst infractions of
RSS specifications. The set of falsifying behaviors may be
analyzed further by considering which part of the specifica-
tion caused the falsification. This is beneficial since the root
cause of failure may be determined and classified quickly.
For example, using this approach, practitioners can return
only the falsifying behaviors related to longitudinal distances
between the ego car and other agents. To the best of the au-
thors knowledge, this is the first time RSS specifications are
formalized for testing vehicles in a simulated environment.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Signal Temporal Logic
Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [17] was defined to express
bounded time requirements over continuous-time (CT) sig-
nals. In this paper, we present the syntax and semantics
of STL over discrete-time (DT) signals as resulting from
simulations.
Definition II.1 (STL Syntax for DT signals). Let x be a
vector variable, i.e., x = [x1, . . . , xn]T , p(x) be a function
over the reals, and I be any non-empty interval of R≥0. The
syntax for Signal Temporal Logic (STL) formulas is provided
by the following grammar:
φ ::= T | p(x) ≥ 0 | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | ©I φ | φUIφ
where T is true, ©I is the next sample operator, and UI is
the until operator.
We utilize a quantitative interpretation for the STL seman-
tics (see [17] for an overview). In order to define quantitative
semantics with a topological interpretation over arbitrary
predicates p(x) ≥ 0, we will need to use a generalized quasi-
metric d [24] (referred to simply as a metric for brevity in
the following) to define a signed distance function:
Definition II.2 (Signed Distance). Let x ∈ X be a point,
S ⊆ X be a set and d be a metric. Then, we define the
Signed Distance from x to S to be
Distd(x, S) :=
{ − inf{d(x, x′) | x′ ∈ S} if x 6∈ S
inf{d(x, x′) | x′ 6∈ S} if x ∈ S
Intuitively, the distance function returns positive values
when x is in the set S and negative values when x is outside
the set S. We should point out that we use the extended
definition of supremum (unionsq) and infimum (u). That is to say,
the supremum of the empty set is defined to be the bottom
element of the domain, while the infimum of the empty set
is defined to be the top element of the domain. For example,
when V = R≥0, then inf ∅ := +∞.
We review STL semantics that map a formula ϕ and a trace
σ to a value drawn from a lattice V , V ∪ {−v | v ∈ V}.
In this work, even though we need an arbitrary lattice of
truth values V to treat Boolean signals, in most of the
examples, we assume that V = R≥0 (with the usual negation
(-) over the reals). We denote the robust valuation of the
formula ϕ over the trace σ at sample i by [[ϕ]]d(σ, i). The
semantics for a predicate p(x) ≥ 0 evaluated at time i over
trace σ is defined as the distance between σ(i) and the set
[[p(x) ≥ 0]] , {x | p(x) ≥ 0}. Intuitively, this distance
represents how robustly the point σ(i) lies within (or is
outside) the set [[p(x) ≥ 0]]. If this distance is zero, then
the smallest perturbation of the point σ(i) can affect the
outcome of σ(i) ∈ [[p(x) ≥ 0]].
Definition II.3 (Discrete-Time Robust Semantics). Consider
an extended generalized quasi-metric space (Y,d). Let σ :
N → Y be a trace, then the robust semantics of an STL
formula ϕ with respect to σ at time sample i is defined as:
[[T]]d(σ, i) :=
⊔
V := >
[[p(x) ≥ 0]]d(σ, i) := Distd(σ(i), [[p(x) ≥ 0]])
[[¬ϕ1]]d(σ, i) := −[[ϕ1]]d(σ, i)
[[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]d(σ, i) := [[ϕ1]]d(σ, i) unionsq [[ϕ2]]d(σ, i)
[[©Iϕ1]]d(σ, i) :={
[[ϕ1]]d(σ, i+ 1) if i+ 1 ∈ N and (i+ 1)∆t ∈ (i∆t+ I)
−> , ⊥ otherwise (i.e., the bottom element)
[[ϕ1 UIϕ2]]d(σ, i) :=⊔
i′∈{j∈N | j∆t∈(i∆t+I)}
[[ϕ2]]d(σ, i′) u l
i≤i′′<i′
[[ϕ1]]d(σ, i
′′)

where > is the top element of the lattice, and t + I =
{t′′ | ∃t′ ∈ I . t′′ = t+ t′}.
Intuitively, the requirement ©Iϕ states that ϕ should be
true at the next sample, which should occur some time in
the physical time interval I. For example, consider ∆t =
0.1 and the formula ψ = ©[0,0.1]T, then ψ is true (>) at
sample i since (i + 1)∆t − i∆t = ∆t ∈ [0, 0.1]. However,
for ∆t = 0.2, ψ would evaluate to false (⊥). The operator
ϕ1 UIϕ2 states that ϕ2 should be satisfied at some time in the
interval I and until then ϕ1 should hold. The other common
Boolean and temporal operators can be defined as syntactic
abbreviations (see [17]). For example, 3Iφ ≡ TUIφ stands
for eventually at some time in the time interval I, φ should
be true, and 2Iφ ≡ ¬3I¬φ stands for always during the
interval I, φ should be true. When I = [0,∞), we will be
dropping I from the notation, e.g., 2[0,∞)φ ≡ 2φ.
An important operator that we will be using in this work
is the release operator ϕ1RIϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 UI¬ϕ2), which
states that ϕ2 should always hold during the time interval I
up to (but not including) the time when ϕ1 becomes true. In
fact, we will need a slightly modified version of the release
operator R which does not require ϕ2 to happen at all if ϕ1
has happened in the past:
[[ϕ1RIϕ2]]d(σ, i) :=l
i′∈{j∈N | j∆t∈(i∆t+I)}
[[ϕ2]]d(σ, i′) unionsq ⊔
i≤i′′≤i′
[[ϕ1]]d(σ, i
′′)

We refer to the above operator as non-strict release operator.
In fact, any non-strict release formula such as ϕ1RIϕ2 can
be rewritten as ϕ1RI(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) using the release operator.
B. Robustness-guided Falsification of STL Specifications
The problem of determining whether a CPS Σ satisfies
a specification φ is an undecidable problem, i.e. there is
no general algorithm that terminates and returns whether
Σ |= φ. Therefore, it is not possible to determine exactly
the minimum robustness over all system behaviors. However,
by repeatedly testing the system, we can check whether a
behavior that does not satisfy the specification exists.
Falsification is the process of finding a counter-example
or falsifying example that proves that the system does not
satisfy the specification. The STL falsification problem is
presented as follows:
Problem II.1 (STL Falsification). Given an MTL formula
φ and a system Σ, find initial conditions and input signals
such that, when given to Σ, generate a falsifying trajectory
for which [[φ]](µ) < 0 (or with Boolean semantics µ 6|= φ).
The robustness semantics of STL enable the development
of an optimization framework that searches for falsifying
behavior in a system. Specifically, the problem may be posed
as a global non-linear optimization problem:
σ? = arg min
σ∈L(Σ)
[[ϕ]]d(σ). (1)
Here, σ is a system trajectory and L(Σ) is the set of
all system behaviors. If the global optimization algorithm
converges to some local minimize σ˜ such that [[ϕ]]d(σ˜) <
0, then a counterexample (adversarial sample) has been
identified, which can be used for debugging (or for training).
In order to solve this non-linear non-convex optimization
problem, a number of stochastic search optimization methods
can be applied (e.g., [24] – for an overview see [12]). We
leverage existing falsification methods to identify falsifying
examples for an autonomous driving system.
III. RSS
In this paper, our focus is to use the RSS specifications
for monitoring the safety of driving behavior of an ego car
[19]. In our test environment, non-ego cars’ behaviors are as
unconstrained as possible. Hence, worst-case scenarios are
not always meaningful. We utilize the RSS requirements to
place constraints solely on the ego car’s behavior and not
other vehicles in the road (referred to as agent vehicles from
now on).
Before diving into a formal definition, we first informally
describe the RSS requirements for an ego car driving on
the highway, and then formally represent them in STL. A
situation is unsafe if and only if the longitudinal and lateral
distances among the ego vehicle and agent vehicles are
unsafe. By lateral and longitudinal safe distances, we refer
to the minimum required distances, which are calculated
based on the current velocities of the ego car, egos maxi-
mum reaction time (ρ), and the maximum/minimum allowed
accelerations stated in Table III.
We illustrate the concept of safe longitudinal distance and
predicates needed in our definitions in Fig. 1. Similarly, in
Fig. 2, we illustrate the concept of safe lateral distance and
related predicates. The idea is that if an ego car continuously
preserves the minimum required safe distances with a leading
agent vehicle until the distances become unsafe, then it
can react responsibly and responsively in order to reach a
safe state again. There are two significant restrictions on
the egos driving behavior based on time. We use hesitation
and reaction times to refer to times that fall in [0, ρ) and
TABLE I: The RSS parameter description in the safe lateral
and longitudinal definitions.
symbol description
ρ reaction time in seconds
µ minimum lateral distance in meter
δt sampling time in seconds
alonminBr minimum required longitudinal braking in m/s
2
alonmaxAcc maximum allowed longitudinal accelerating in m/s
2
alatminBr minimum required lateral braking in m/s
2
alonmaxBr maximum allowed longitudinal braking in m/s
2
alatmaxAcc maximum allowed lateral accelerating in m/s
2
[ρ,+∞], respectively. For all the hesitation times, the ego car
cannot exceed a maximum lateral/longitudinal acceleration
bound depending on which distance changed from safe to
unsafe. For all reaction times, the ego car has to react
responsibly. That is, the ego car has to start decelerating
with the minimum required deceleration depending on which
distance changed from safe to unsafe. For the case that a
situation becomes unsafe laterally, there is another restriction
on the velocity of the ego car. That is, in the reaction time,
the ego car has to control its lateral velocity so that it never
deviates more than a constant µ/2 from its original lateral
position when the situation became unsafe laterally. All the
restrictions are lifted when an unsafe situation becomes safe
again. For more details see [19] and [22].
@
𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒙,𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒏
during [𝟎, 𝝆)
𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏,𝒃𝒓𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒏
[𝝆, +∞)
𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒙,𝒃𝒓𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒏
[𝟎, +∞)
ego car
front car
Safe Longitudinal 
Distance
Ego’s maximum 
movement before braking
Ego’s maximum movement 
while braking
Front car’s minimum 
movement while 
braking
Fig. 1: Longitudinal Safety. See Table I for the symbol
definitions.
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right car
ego car
Safe Longitudinal 
Distance
Ego’s maximum 
movement before steering
Ego’s maximum movement 
while steering
𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏,𝒃𝒓𝒂𝒌𝒆
𝒍𝒂𝒕 in [𝝆, +∞)
𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒙,𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒍
𝒍𝒂𝒕 in [0, 𝝆)
Fig. 2: Lateral Safety. See Table I for the symbol definitions.
In the rest of this section, we represent a slightly modified
version of the formula ϕlat,lonresp from the Remark III.3 in
[22]. For the sake of space and readability, for the lateral
requirements, we assumed that the ego car is driving on the
left side of the other car. Also, we assume that the car behind
the front car is the ego car.
Definition III.1 (RSS formalization in STL for a single ego
car driving in highway along other cars). The below formula
ϕlat,lonresp enforces the required RSS restrictions on the velocity
and accelerations of an ego car driving on a highway.
ϕlat,lonresp ≡ ϕlon ∧ ϕlat ∧ ϕlat,lon ∧ ϕ¬lat,¬lon
ϕlon ≡
2
((¬Slatl,r ∧ Slonb,f ∧©(¬Slatl,r ∧ ¬Slonb,f ))→©P lon)
ϕlat ≡
2
((
Slatl,r ∧ ¬Slonb,f ∧©(¬Slatl,r ∧ ¬Slonb,f )
)→©P lat)
ϕlat,lon ≡
2
((
Slatl,r ∧ Slonb,f ∧©(¬Slatl,r ∧ ¬Slonb,f )
)→
©(P lat ∨ P lon)
)
ϕ¬lat,¬lon ≡(
(¬Slatl,r ∧ ¬Slonb,f )→©(P lat ∨ P lon)
)
where P lon and P lat are defined as
P lon ≡ ((Slatl,r ∨ Slonb,f )R[0,ρ)(Alonb,maxAcc)∧
(Slatl,r ∨ Slonb,f )R[ρ,+∞)(Alonb,minBr
)
P lat ≡ (P lat0,ρ ∧ P lat,1ρ,∞ ∧ P lat,2ρ,∞ )
and the subformulas P lat0,ρ , P
lat,1
ρ,∞ and P
lat,2
ρ,∞ are defined as
P lat0,ρ ≡ (Slatl,r ∨ Slonb,f )R[0,ρ)(Alatl,maxAcc)
P lat,1ρ,∞ ≡
(
Slatl,r ∨ Slonb,f ∨ V latl,stop
)R[ρ,+∞)Alatl,minBr
P lat,2ρ,∞ ≡ (Slatl,r ∨ Slonb,f )R[ρ,+∞)
(
V latl,stop →
(Slatl,r ∨ Slonb,f )R(V latl,neg)
)
By V latl,neg we mean that the µ−lateral velocity of the ego car
is less than or equal to zero.
Note that all the predicates’ definitions and assumptions
can be found in [22]. The formula ϕlat,lonresp consists of four
subformulas such as for each a unique trigger or response
is defined. The subformula ϕlon gets triggered if a safe
longitudinal and an unsafe lateral distances become unsafe all
together. We call the time that both lateral and longitudinal
distances become unsafe, a dangerous time. If time tb is a
new dangerous time and after that until the current time t
all times in [tb, t] are dangerous times, then we call tb the
Dangerous Threshold time as in [19]. The desired response
for this case enforces some longitudinal restrictions on the
behavior of the ego car. Similarly, the subformula ϕlat gets
triggered if an unsafe longitudinal and a safe lateral distances
become unsafe all together. The desired response for this case
enforces some lateral restrictions on the behavior of the ego
car.
Unlike the ϕlon and ϕlat subformulas, the next two
subformulas ϕlat,lon and ϕ¬lat,¬lon are designed to cover
the cases that either a situation changes from completely
safe to unsafe, or it starts completely unsafe. The desired
response to both cases requires either or both responses of
the two previous responses.
IV. RSS APPLICATION ON AUTOMATED TEST
GENERATION AND CLASSIFICATION
By using the formalized RSS requirements as STL for-
mulas, we can collect more meaningful samples for testing
purposes. More specifically, we are interested in screening
test driving scenarios and classifying them based on safety
conditions introduced by RSS. One advantage of automated
and guided test generation and classification is to only
generate automatically annotated tests for testing and training
perception based systems in ADS.
In this section, we show how one can utilize the formalized
RSS requirements to select useful scenarios among a set of
arbitrarily generated driving scenarios for testing purposes.
We used S-TALIRO and Sim-ATAV in our experiments
for monitoring and simulating trajectories, respectively [25],
[16], [14].
To show the effectiveness of our proposed framework, we
represent and use a basic collision avoidance specification
(CAS from now on) concerning the distances of an ego
vehicle and other agent vehicles. We compare the result of
monitored scenarios by using the CAS and the RSS require-
ments separately. We formalized the CAS requirements in
STL representation in the following definition.
Definition IV.1 (Collision Avoidance Specification). We call
two objects collided if and only if their shortest distance get
closer than a δ. The STL version of the requirement is shown
as below:
ϕcas ≡ 2¬
(
dxa1ego < δx ∧ dya1ego < δy∧
dxa2ego < δx ∧ dya2ego < δy
)
where Table II represents the symbol descriptions.
For the tests, we only considered highway traffic scenarios,
which by design do not include intersections, and wherein
all the self-driving vehicles are moving in the same direction.
In the scenarios, there are two agent vehicles and one ego
vehicle. We generated our test scenarios with some restric-
tions for the initial positions, orientations, and speeds of the
vehicles. Also, we enable the two agent vehicles to drive
along the highway and maneuver randomly. We used the
information in Table III as our test generating configuration
parameters.
Note that our approach is not restricted to the presented
scenarios, and it applies to the more general traffic scenarios
which are discussed in [19]. We used DP-TALIRO [25], [26]
TABLE II: The CAS symbol description in the safe lateral
and longitudinal definitions. All distances are in meter.
symbol description
dxa1ego longitudinal distance between the go vehicle and the adversarial vehicle 1
dxa2ego longitudinal distance between the go vehicle and the adversarial vehicle 2
dya1ego lateral distance between the go vehicle and the adversarial vehicle 1
dya2ego lateral distance between the go vehicle and the adversarial vehicle 2
δx a constant safe longitudinal distance
δy a constant safe lateral distance
TABLE III: The parameter values in the case-study and
experiments.
parameter value range parameter value range
xegoinit [0,5] m y
ego
init [-1.5,4.5] m
θegoinit [-pi/8,pi/8] v
ego
init [10,25] m/s
xa1init [20,40] m y
a1
init [-3.5,-1.5] m
xa2init [10,25] m y
a2
init [1,4] m
va1init [5,15] m/s v
a2
init [0,30] m/s
ya1 [-5,0] m va1 [10,30] m/s
ya2 [0,5] m va2 [4,20] m/s
as our offline monitoring tool for computing the robustness
of the traffic scenarios.
A. Vehicle Controller
In our experiments, we used an existing Sim-ATAV vehicle
controller. The controller receives (provided by simulator)
camera, LIDAR, and Radar sensor information as to its input
signals. There is a perception system as part of the controller
that performs sensor data processing and sensor fusion. The
controller is capable of detecting object types (vehicle, pedes-
trian) and their predicted trajectories. The control algorithm
sends signals to the throttle and steering actuators. The
controller’s goal is to safely follow a predetermined path.
For more information, we refer readers to [14]. We chose
25m/s as the max and target velocity for the ego vehicle.
B. Simulated Tests and Environment
In our experiments, the simulated environment consists of
a straight highway with three lanes. The initial test conditions
concern position, orientation, and velocity of the ego vehicle.
The initial test conditions for the agent vehicles concern
the same parameters as the ego vehicle, except that their
orientations are fixed.
At each run of test generation, a uniform random sampler
randomly chooses the initial conditions of all the vehicles.
TABLE IV: The RSS parameter values in the case-study
and experiments.
parameter value parameter value
ρ 0.5 sec µ 0.4 m
δt 0.01 sec alonminBr 4 m/s
2
alonmaxAcc 4.5 m/s
2 alatminBr 3 m/s
2
alonmaxBr 2.5 m/s
2 alatmaxAcc 3 m/s
2
It also generates random trajectories for agent vehicles. In
this experiment, we predetermined a fixed trajectory for the
ego vehicle. However, the ego vehicles controller is free
to do collision avoidance maneuvers. We ran a (hit-and-
run) sampler to produce and store one thousand of sample
scenarios for the test parameters shown in Table III. We
chose the parameter values for demonstration purposes and
they might not reflect realistic values. During the rest of the
section, we refer to the code-base that controls test screening
and classifying test control unit. The details of tasks in Fig.
3 are explained in the following:
• (a): The very first step is to design test scenarios
and assign range values for configurable parameters.
For example, we used data in the Table III in our
experiments. Also, we used Sim-ATAV to design driving
scenarios.
• (b): We use S-TALIRO as our monitoring tool, and
configure it based on the our test design. Two important
tasks here are to formalize a desirable specification in
STL form and define input signals. Here we use two
STL formulas in Def. III.1 and Def. IV.1 for comparison
purposes.
• (c): The S-TALIRO tool is equipped with random sam-
plers and optimizers. We use the random-walk algorithm
from the S-TALIRO to generate uniformly random test
data. When optimization is needed, we use Simulated
Annealing with hit and run Monte Carlo sampling.
The test data consists of all the initial values for the
vehicles (as in Table III) that are needed to run the
designed simulation. The test control unit passes the
generated test to the Sim-ATAV through an interface.
Sim-ATAV initializes the simulator (Webots) and makes
it ready to run the test. When the simulation terminates,
the Sim-ATAV passes the simulated trajectories of all
the vehicles to the test control unit. Next, the test
control unit translates the trajectories into the lane-based
coordinate system that the RSS rules are defined based
on. Lastly, using the translated trajectories, we compute
the final input signals to the monitor. That is, each signal
represents a corresponding predicate in the RSS formula
such as safe distances or µ-lateral velocities.
• (d): Our DP-TALIRO monitor computes the robustness
of the generated driving trajectories (input signal) for
the ego vehicle given an STL specification formula. The
positive or negative sign of the computed robustness
value states if the specification is satisfiable or falsi-
fiable, respectively. The magnitude of the robustness
value determines the resistance of the signal against
perturbations.
• (e): In this experiment, we are interested in accumu-
lating test scenarios that do not meet safety standards
based on RSS rules. If the robustness of the RSS
specification was negative, then the test driving scenario
does not satisfy the RSS requirements, and, therefore,
it is a useful sample.
  Test Configuration and Initiation 
Monitor Configuration Random Test Generation 
Robustness Computation 
Test Quality Determination 
(a) 
(b) (c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Fig. 3: The flowchart represents the executing order of major
tasks in our framework.
C. Case Study
We chose some interesting scenarios to explain and ana-
lyze here. In these scenarios we show how the RSS specifi-
cation helps to select useful tests for verifying the vehicle’s
controller. The first scenario was test number 131 among
1000 uniformly generated tests. Figure 4a represents half of
the trajectory in the test (from time t = 0 to time t = 5).
The colors of boxes in each trace represents a vehicle in the
simulation. The ego vehicle with yellow color drives in the
middle lane. The two other vehicles in magenta and blue
drive to the left and right of the ego vehicle. We highlighted
the part of the trajectories that were close to the ego vehicle
with red color. Also, under the trajectory diagram in Fig. 4,
there are four snapshots taken from the simulation at different
times.
We monitored the specification in Def. III.1 for the above
scenario. The robustness result was negative, and the monitor
reported the alonmaxAcc in subformula P
lon as the predicate
that caused the maximum negative robustness value. This
was due to high acceleration by the ego vehicle in the
beginning of the scenario. The ego vehicle starts braking as
soon as its controller detects the leading vehicle and assigns
a high level of caution to it.
However, during the hesitation period, it did exceed the
required maximum acceleration. Interestingly, this case did
not violate the RSS rules for the blue vehicle driving closely
to the right, but because of the red vehicle on the left of it.
In Figure 5, we demonstrated two common scenarios in
our previous experiments. A test scenario illustrated in Fig.
5(a) starts for the ego vehicle in the right-most lane. The ego
vehicle planned to change lane into the middle lane, and stay
in that lane. The other agent vehicle in front of it started in
the middle lane and then starts changing lane into the right-
most lane. The vehicle control in the ego vehicle detects
the front vehicle and tries to reduce its speed but not its
direction. The RSS requirements demands for safe steering
behavior which in this case was not respected, and therefore
this is a useful test. In another situation demonstrated in Fig.
5(b), the ego initially is very close to the blue vehicle in front
of it, and then the blue vehicle turns in front of it unsafely
and collides with it. This scenario is initially unsafe, and the
ego vehicle should respond according to either of the lateral
or longitudinal safety requirements. If the initial speed of the
ego vehicle is not too high, then it can brake on-time and
satisfying the RSS requirements. Otherwise, the ego vehicle
cannot react on-time and contributes to the collision, which
qualifies it to be collected as a useful test. We emphasize that
0 20 40 60 80 100
-5
0
5
(b) (d) (e)
(b) (c) (d) (b) (c) (d) (e)(e)
(c)
(a) A sample trajectory of three vehicles. The ego vehicle’s trajectory is shown in the
middle lane and colored yellow. The red part of the vehicle’s trajectory in the lowest
lane highlights the close distance to the ego vehicle. The (b),(c),(d), and (e) refer to
the times that below snapshots are taken.
(b) first snapshot. (c) second snapshot.
(d) third snapshot. (e) forth snapshot.
Fig. 4: A sample traffic scenario taken from Webots.
(a) A scenario starts in an unsafe lon-
gitudinal and safe lateral situation, and
then it also becomes unsafe laterally
when the cars change their lane.
(b) A scenario starts unsafe laterally
and longitudinally. The blue agent ve-
hicle turns in front of the ego vehicle
and causes a virtual collision.
Fig. 5: Two common unsafe scenarios.
this class of test case results, which are hard for a human
to detect, were one of the motivations for us to propose this
approach for test generation.
In the next section, we discuss and present our experiments
and their result.
D. The necessity of RSS in testing
For all the experiments in this section, we used the values
in Table IV and Table III. Also, the length of each simulated
driving scenario is 10 seconds. In our first experiment,
we generated and stored one thousand uniformly random
driving scenarios. We do not precisely follow the executing
sequences shown in Fig. 3 as we are going to compare the
result of monitoring the same test data against two different
STL formulas. Next, we computed the robustness of the test
data against CAS specifications.
TABLE V: Statistical result about robustness of monitoring
RSS and CAS specifications. We used “pos” as an abbrevi-
ation of positive and “neg” as an abbreviation for negative.
description values description values
Total pos (RSS) 771 Total pos (CAS) 406
Total neg (RSS) 229 Total neg (CAS) 594
Total zeros (RSS) 0 Total zeros (CAS) 0
one-by-one comparison between RSS and CAS results
pos (RSS) pos (CAS) 387 neg (RSS) neg (CAS) 210
neg (RSS) pos (CAS) 19 pos (RSS) neg (CAS) 384
TABLE VI: The break down statistics of predicates that
caused the highest negative robustness.
predicates # of violations description
Slonb,f 2 safe longitudinal distance
Slatl,r 23 safe lateral distance
Alatl,maxAcc 67 maximum allowed lateral acceleration
Alatl,minBr 0 minimum required lateral brake
V latl,stop 68 zero µ−lateral velocity
V latl,neg 0 non-positive µ−lateral velocity
Alonb,maxAcc 33 maximum allowed longitudinal acceleration
Alonb,minBr 36 minimum required longitudinal brake
Execution Statistics
violation % 22.9% falsified percentage using the RSS rules
The result is demonstrated in the third and fourth columns
of the upper part of Table V. About 40% of the result did
not violate their specification, and the other 60% did violate
their specifications. The result of computed robustness of the
test data against RSS specifications is shown in the first and
second columns of the upper part of the same table. The 23%
violated scenarios for the RSS case is noticeably less than the
60% for the CAS case. The lower part of Table V represents
the statistics of all combinations of positive and negative
results of each specification for each test. Note that the
total number of tests for which both specifications falsified
and satisfied them is 210 and 387, respectively. The result
suggests that 384 falsified tests by the CAS specifications
are not of our interest. Furthermore, 19 tests were falsified
with the RSS requirements, but not with the CAS require-
ments. This implies that the test scenarios were potentially
dangerous and hence worth further analysis, but they did
not necessarily lead to a collision. In this experiment, using
the RSS specifications, we can disregard 384 meaningless
and add 19 meaningful tests (about 40% of the tests) that
were misclassified by using a simple collision avoidance
requirement (CAS). Table VI denotes the list of predicates
TABLE VII: Statistical result about robustness of monitoring
RSS and CAS specifications in mostly unsafe situations.
We used “pos” as an abbreviation of positive (satisfying
specifications) and “neg” as an abbreviation for negative
(violating specifications).
description values description values
Total pos (RSS) 406 Total pos (CAS) 20
Total neg (RSS) 594 Total neg (CAS) 980
Total zeros (RSS) 0 Total zeros (CAS) 0
one-by-one comparison between RSS and CAS results
pos (RSS) pos (CAS) 0 neg (RSS) neg (CAS) 574
neg (RSS) pos (CAS) 20 pos (RSS) neg (CAS) 406
in the RSS formula and the number of times that each
one got falsified with the highest negative magnitude (most
violating). A clustering algorithm can use the information
about the falsified predicates to more tailor the test scenarios.
E. Improving search-based testing through RSS
In another experiment, we followed exactly the flow in Fig.
3. We engaged the optimizer and used the CAS specification
as its cost function (s.t. optimality means lower robustness
for an input signal) to find more dangerous test driving
scenarios. We let the optimizer to find the worst falsifying
behavior for the CAS specifications for one thousand iter-
ations and stored the samples and their robustness result.
The result is presented in the third and fourth columns of
the upper part of Table VII. Exactly 2% of the result have
positive robustness values, and the other 98% have negative
values. The high percentage of negative result is because
of the optimization. The result of computed robustness of
the stored test data against RSS specifications is shown in
the first and second columns of the upper part of the same
table. The 60% negative robustness for the RSS case is
substantially less than the 98% for the CAS case. The lower
part of Table VII represents the statistics of all combinations
of positive and negative results of each specification for
each test. Note that the total number of tests for which
both specifications falsified and satisfied them is 574 and
0, respectively. The result suggests that 406 falsified tests by
the CAS specifications are not of our interest. Furthermore,
20 tests were falsified with the RSS requirements but not
with the CAS requirements. In this experiment, using the
RSS specifications, we can disregard 406 meaningless and
add 20 meaningful tests (about 42% of the tests) that
were misclassified by using a simple collision avoidance
requirement.
F. Falsification by RSS
In the last experiment, according to the diagram in Fig. 3
we engaged the optimizer and used the RSS specification as
its cost function to find more relevant test driving scenarios.
We let the optimizer to try to optimally falsify the RSS
specifications for 350 iterations and stored the samples and
their robustness result. Similar to what we did in the last
two experiments, we repeated the process for the CAS
specifications. The result are depicted in Table VIII and Table
IX. The optimizer is especially helpful when falsification is
the priority. An alternative approach could be running a script
that screens all the randomly generated tests and computes
and classifies their safeties. However, this approach can take
longer to falsify the specifications in comparison to using an
optimizer.
The predicate statistics in Table VI and Table IX suggests
that we can further classify test scenarios based on their vio-
lated constraints. For example, we might only be interested in
unsafe test scenarios in which the maximum allowed lateral
acceleration denoted by predicate alatmaxAcc was violated by
the controller.
TABLE VIII: Statistical result about robustness of monitor-
ing RSS and CAS specifications where we used the RSS
rules for optimization. We used “pos” as an abbreviation of
positive and “neg” as an abbreviation for negative.
description values description values
Total pos (RSS) 292 Total pos (CAS) 50
Total neg (RSS) 58 Total neg (CAS) 300
Total zeros (RSS) 0 Total zeros (CAS) 0
one-by-one comparison between RSS and CAS results
pos (RSS) pos (CAS) 49 neg (RSS) neg (CAS) 57
neg (RSS) pos (CAS) 1 pos (RSS) neg (CAS) 243
TABLE IX: The break down statistics of predicates that
caused the highest negative robustness in the last experiment.
predicates # of violations description
Slonb,f 2 safe longitudinal distance
Slatl,r 3 safe lateral distance
Alatl,maxAcc 13 maximum allowed lateral acceleration
Alatl,minBr 0 minimum required lateral brake
V latl,stop 0 zero µ−lateral velocity
V latl,neg 0 non-positive µ−lateral velocity
Alonb,maxAcc 35 maximum allowed longitudinal acceleration
Alonb,minBr 5 minimum required longitudinal brake
Execution Statistics
violation % 16.5% falsified percentage using the RSS rules
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an automated and qualification
based method for generating driving test scenarios. The
generated tests could be used for discovering control software
bugs in autonomous vehicles.
We integrated the RSS requirements into our Sim-ATAV
framework, which is publicly available as part of S-TALIRO
tool. Now it is possible to test the control and perception
system stack against the RSS model.
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